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O P I N I O N* 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
Plaintiff-Appellant Darrell E. Williams, Esq., appeals the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Webb Law Firm, P.C. (“WLF”).  
Williams sued WLF for violation of the Employee Retirement Income Securities Act of 
1974 (“ERISA”)—specifically, for breach of fiduciary duty by misclassifying him as an 
independent contractor, instead of as an employee.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment because Williams’ claim is barred by the applicable statutes of limitations in 29 
U.S.C. § 1113.  We will affirm. 
I.  Background 
In January 2001, Williams began working for WLF under an independent 
contractor agreement (the “First ICA”) as a patent attorney.  On July 1, 2001, Williams’ 
employment status changed so that he was an associate attorney, receiving full 
employment benefits.  However, on January 1, 2006, Williams returned to being 
classified as an independent contractor and began working under the terms of a Second 
ICA.  According to Williams, his work duties and activities were the same as when he 
was an associate.   
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
  
On January 10, 2007, Williams signed a Third ICA, which reiterated that he was 
an independent contractor.  On May 16, 2007, the parties signed an addendum to the 
Third ICA, pursuant to which WLF agreed to pay a scaled percentage of Williams’ total 
monthly medical costs, depending on how many hours Williams billed.   
On November 15, 2009, Williams’ relationship with WLF was terminated.  
Williams applied for unemployment benefits within two weeks of his termination, and he 
began to receive unemployment benefits in May 2010.   
On November 8, 2012, Williams filed the present complaint.  The District Court 
granted summary judgment to WLF based on the statutes of limitations in 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1113.  Those statutes of limitations provide that a lawsuit for ERISA breach of 
fiduciary duty is barred if filed either more than six years after “the date of the last action 
which constituted a part of the breach” or more than three years after the date that the 
plaintiff had “actual knowledge” of the breach.  29 U.S.C. § 1113.  Williams’ lawsuit 
failed under both: (1) the date of the last action which formed a part of WLF’s alleged 
breach of fiduciary duty occurred on January 1, 2006 (and, therefore, the six-year statute 
of limitations in 29 U.S.C. § 1113(1) bars Williams’ claim), and (2) Williams knew about 
the material elements of WLF’s alleged breach and knew that these actions constituted a 
breach of a fiduciary duty, at the latest, in May 2007 (and therefore the three-year statute 
of limitations in § 1113(2) bars his claim).  Williams appealed. 
  
II.  Analysis1 
To succeed on appeal, Williams must show that the District Court erred twice: first 
in determining that the six-year statute of limitations in 29 U.S.C. § 1113(1) bars 
Williams’ claim, and second in determining that the three-year “actual knowledge” 
statute of limitations in 29 U.S.C. § 1113(2) bars his claim.  He cannot show error in 
either determination. 
 A. Six-Year Statute of Limitations 
ERISA provides that “[n]o action may be commenced under this title with respect 
to a fiduciary’s breach of any responsibility, duty, or obligation . . . (1) six years after . . . 
the date of the last action which constituted a part of the breach or violation.”  29 U.S.C. 
§ 1113(1).  We must ask when the “date of the last action” was in this case.  
The District Court determined that the date of the last action was the date that 
WLF allegedly misclassified Williams as an independent contractor—i.e., January 1, 
2006, when Williams began working under the Second ICA.  Williams urges that the 
proper date is when Williams began working under the Third ICA or, alternatively, when 
he began working under the subsequent addendum to the Third ICA.  If the date of the 
last action is either of the dates Williams urges, then the six-year statute of limitations 
does not bar his claim. 
The District Court was correct.  Neither the Third ICA nor its addendum purported 
to alter Williams’ employment status: they merely repeated the alleged misrepresentation 
                                              
1 “We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s order for summary judgment.”  
Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2015).   
  
of Williams’ employment status as an independent contractor.  We have held that 
subsequent misrepresentations that are “mere continuations of the initial 
misrepresentations that led to the changes of employment” do not extend the date of last 
action.  Ranke v. Sanofi-Synthelabo Inc., 436 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 2006).  It follows 
that, in a case where an employee’s employment status is misrepresented as independent 
contractor, mere continuations of the initial misrepresentation do not extend the date of 
last action.  Thus, because the Third ICA (and addendum) merely continued to state that 
Williams was an independent contractor, the date of last action was the effective date of 
the Second ICA.  Accordingly, the six-year statute of limitations bars Williams’ claim. 
 B. Three-Year Statute of Limitations 
Alternatively, Williams’ claim fails pursuant to the three-year statute of limitations 
in 29 U.S.C. § 1113(2).  ERISA provides that “[n]o action may be commenced under this 
title with respect to a fiduciary’s breach of any responsibility, duty, or obligation . . . (2) 
three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the 
breach or violation.”  29 U.S.C. § 1113(2).  We must ask when Williams had actual 
knowledge of his claim.  Williams urges that he did not have actual knowledge until he 
knew that the law treated him as an employee, whereas the District Court found that he 
had “actual knowledge” once he knew all the material facts about his employment status. 
In Gluck v. Unisys Corp., we held that “‘actual knowledge of a breach or 
violation’ requires that a plaintiff have actual knowledge of all material facts necessary to 
understand that some claim exists, which facts could include necessary opinions of 
experts, knowledge of a transaction’s harmful consequences, or even actual harm.”  960 
  
F.2d 1168, 1177 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1113(2)).  In 
other words, “‘[a]ctual knowledge of a breach or violation’ requires knowledge of all 
relevant facts at least sufficient to give the plaintiff knowledge that a fiduciary duty has 
been breached or ERISA provision violated.”  Id. at 1178. 
Subsequently, in National Security Systems, Inc. v. Iola, we clarified that “[w]hat 
matters here is whether [plaintiffs] had actual knowledge of all material facts necessary to 
appreciate that a claim against [defendant] existed.”  700 F.3d 65, 100 (3d Cir. 2012).  
We rejected as “meritless” the Iola plaintiffs’ contention that they lacked actual 
knowledge that the defendant was a fiduciary, given that they “ceded to [defendant] 
discretionary authority to manage and administer plan assets.”  Id. at 99.  In other words, 
it does not matter whether the plaintiffs knew that the law would deem the defendant to 
be a fiduciary, so long as the plaintiffs knew all the relevant facts that would give the 
defendant fiduciary status.  See id. 
Like the Iola plaintiffs, Williams contends that he did not know the law would 
treat him as an employee, but he does not deny that he knew all the facts relevant to 
deeming him an employee.  As the District Court stated, it is “‘patently obvious’” that, 
“by May 2007, Williams knew all the material elements of [WLF’s] breach of its 
fiduciary duty.”  (App. 24 (quoting Kurz v. Phila. Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1544, 1551 (3d Cir. 
1996)).)  Williams did not need to know he was entitled to unemployment benefits under 
the law in order to have actual knowledge of the alleged breach.  Accordingly, the three-
year statute of limitations bars his claim. 
III. Conclusion 
  
For either of the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.  
